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Abstract
In this essay, I wish to invite young scholars to learn, use, and contribute to 
accounting theory. In this invitation, I argue theory has lineage, is important and can 
be fun. Its lineage comes from the post-WWII scientific revolution in management 
education and research. Theory is important because it is the successful interaction 
between theory and empirical work that ultimately advances an academic discipline. 
Theory can be fun because when done well, learning, using and contributing to theory 
can be an enjoyable activity for all scholars, either as consumers or as producers of 
theory.
1. A Little History
One way to view theory is that it is a coherent set of ideas that explains, or purports 
to explain, a set of real-world phenomena. The phenomena need not be obviously 
coherent on the surface (for example, the seemingly endless features of life forms on 
earth) but the theory needs to be coherent (for example, Darwin’s theory of evolution).
As such, a theory offers a consistent, disciplined way to view the world, or a 
worldview. The worldview of business management changed dramatically after World 
War II. Partially aided by the Ford Foundation, American business education underwent 
a scientific transformation. Graduate School of Industrial Administration (now 
TepperSchool of Business) at Carnegie Tech (now Carnegie Mellon University) was part 
of a small group of business schools which broke new ground in management science 
and laid the foundation of the modern management education of today. The strategy at 
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1 For additional reading, see Demski et al. (2002) for a discussion of the intellectual foundations of accounting 
and see Liang (2001) for a short but more focused background on the rise of information economics in 
accounting theory.
Carnegie was to invite scientists from base disciplines such as mathematics, economics, 
and psychology to study applied business problems theoretically. Individually and as a 
group, these scholars made well-known pioneering contributions including: Bounded 
Rationality (Simon, 1947), Statistical Auditing (Cyert and Trueblood, 1957), the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem (Miller and Modigliani, 1958), the Organizational Theory 
of the Firm (Cyert and March, 1963), Rational Expectations (Muth, 1961 and Lucas, 
1972), and managerial accounting based on mathematical programming (Charnes, 
Cooper, and Ijiri, 1963 and Kaplan and Thompson, 1971).1
Based on the early eﬀort of scholars at GSIA (Tepper) and at other institutions, the 
research and educational programs at modern business schools today are ﬁrmly grounded 
on three basic worldviews (what has been called a “tripod”).
t .BUIFNBUJDT PQFSBUJPO SFTFBSDI BOENBUIFNBUJDBM QSPHSBNNJOH 	MJOFBS BOEOPO
linear) are the basis for production and operation management. Linear algebra 
underlies double-entry bookkeeping practices. Large-scale computing makes available 
the emerging ﬁelds of quantitative marketing, data-mining, and machine learning.
t &DPOPNJDT FDPOPNJDEFDJTJPONBLJOHVOEFSVODFSUBJOUZ UIFCFESPDL GPSNPEFSO
information economics, is the basis for many business functional areas such as 
accounting, ﬁnance, and marketing.
t 1TZDIPMPHZQTZDIPMPHJDBMBOECFIBWJPSBMTDJFODFBUUIFJOEJWJEVBMMFWFMGSPNXIJDI
group behavior derives, is the basis for modern organizational behavior research and 
the emerging interdisciplinary ﬁelds of behavioral economics and ﬁnance.
2.  Worldview of Accounting
Within the broad framework of business management, accounting oﬀers an amazing 
array of alternative worldviews. Ijiri (1967) and Mattessich (1964) stress the elegant 
mathematical structure of bookkeeping and accounting; a modern revival is found in 
Arya et al. (2000). Sterling (1970) emphasizes decision theory. Gonedes and Dopuch 
(1974) and Beaver (1981) emphasize accounting’s informational role for capital markets, 
paralleling modern finance. Demski and Feltham (1976) pioneer an information 
economics approach, extended by Christensen and Demski (2002) and Christensen 
and Feltham (2002, 2007). Hilton (1985) incorporates mathematical psychology to 
the theory of accounting information choice and use. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
present a positive theory of accounting. Ball (1989) views accounting in the context 
of a ﬁrm serving as a specialist contracting intermediary. Sunder (1997) oﬀers a theory 
of accounting based on a broad theory of contracts. More alternative worldviews are 
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emerging as the academic ﬁeld evolves along with the ﬂuid accounting institutions it 
studies.
The beauty and attraction of theory is that no one single worldview is necessarily 
“correct.” Christopher Sims oﬀers a pragmatic view of theory as data compression. That 
is, scientiﬁc advances are “discoveries of ways to compress data concerning the natural 
world ... with minimal loss of information.” (Sims 1996, p. 105) In other words, theory 
is useful because “it provides structure for organizing our thoughts about some set of 
phenomena.” (Christensen and Demski, 2002, p. 6) It can be added that for diﬀerent 
sets of phenomena, the worldview (or theory) which compresses the most data (or with 
the minimal loss of information) may turn out to be diﬀerent. Theory oﬀers a “buﬀet,” 
not a single meal.
3.  Interplay Between Theoretical and Empirical Work
3.1  Past Examples of Interplay
Advances in an academic discipline depend critically on the successful interaction 
between theoretical and empirical explorations. There are many such examples in 
accounting and non-accounting ﬁelds.
t *OQIZTJDTUIFDMBTTJDFYBNQMFJTUIFTUVEZPGQMBOFUBSZNPUJPOCZ5ZDIP#SBIFBOE
Johannes Kepler. Nobel Laureate Tjallings Koopmans described their diﬀerences and 
outcome succinctly in his 1947 article “Measurement without Theory.” According 
to Koopmans, “Tycho’s main contribution was a systematic accumulation of careful 
measurements” (Koopmans, 1947, p. 161) even though he believed, incorrectly, 
“in the uniform circular motion as the natural basic principle underlying the 
course of celestial bodies.” (p. 161). Kepler’s more celebrated success was “due to 
his willingness to strike out for new models and hypothesis if such were needed to 
account for the observations.” (p. 161) In this case, the combination of large scale 
empirical work and a daring theorist contributed to a theoretical success viewed from 
Sim’s perspective: the eventual theory compresses a huge amount of the data with 
little loss of information.
t *ONBDSPFDPOPNJDT GPSB MPOHUJNFUIF1IJMMJQTDVSWF	UIBU JT UIF JOWFSTFSFMBUJPO
between the unemployment rate and inﬂation) was assumed to be a stable structural 
economic relation so the implied policy choices (policy makers could increase 
employment by inﬂating price levels via ﬁscal or monetary policies) seemed logical. 
However, theoreticians Milton Friedman, Edmund Phelps, and Robert Lucas, Jr. 
introduced the idea of expectations (thus the distinction between anticipated versus 
unanticipated inﬂation or policies) and reasoned that systematically exploiting the 
Phillips Curve to lower unemployment would only succeed temporarily at best and 
would certainly fail in the long-run. The validity of their reasoning was conﬁrmed 
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by the actual macroeconomic experience of the 1970s. This understanding of 
stabilization policy is now the foundation for monetary policy in a number of 
countries in their efforts to achieve and maintain a low and stable inflation rate. 
More fundamentally, their insights show that empirical documentation of a relation 
does not necessarily establish a causal relation (and thus a policy implication). The 
lesson, embodied in the famous Lucas Critique (Lucas, 1972 and 1976), is that past 
observations of people’s behavior and relations which econometricians study were 
inﬂuenced by past economic policies and institutions. Further and more importantly, 
people understand these inﬂuences in choosing the behavior which we study. When 
we propose changes to policies and to institutions, this will aﬀect people’s behavior 
and thus the relations themselves will change accordingly. For example, changing 
policies may not move the economy along a given Phillips Curve, but may shift the 
curve upwards or downwards instead. As a result, past relations may not predict 
people’s behavior under the new policies. This is an example where deeper thinking 
in theory can reconcile the observable relations and policy implications from these 
relations. (See Phelps, 1987, p. 858-860 and McCallum, 1989, chapter 9 for curious 
readers on this macro topic.)
t *O BDDPVOUJOH UIF SFMBUJPOCFUXFFO BDDPVOUJOH BOE FDPOPNJDNFBTVSFNFOUIBT
a long and varied history. Economists Irwin Fisher and Sir John Hicks have been 
influential in how early accounting theorists (such as William Paton and Sidney 
Alexander) view income measurement (that is, accounting measurement of income 
and capital must mirror economic concepts of income and capital). However, many 
years of practice and observation consistently prove that both accounting income 
and accounting asset values are far from their economic counterparts (such as stock 
returns and value). The empirical campaign in accounting, which started in the 
1960’s, had proceeded largely without much valuation theory linking accounting 
income and market observables such as prices and returns. The rise of modern 
accounting valuation theory, due to James Ohlson and his fellow co-authors such as 
Jerry Feltham, changed the landscape and ushered in a new era of empirical work 
based on a formal neoclassical theory of price reﬂecting accounting fundamentals. 
This is an example of empirical work leading theoretical work, followed by 
innovation in theoretical work, which leads to further and more reﬁned empirical 
work. 
3.2 How Theory Can Aid Empirical Work
When applied well, empiricists beneﬁt from theoretical guidance in every stage of a 
typical empirical examination:
t JEFOUJGZJOHBSFTFBSDIRVFTUJPO
t EFWFMPQJOHSFTFBSDIIZQPUIFTFT
t EFTJHOJOHBOEDPOEVDUJOHFNQJSJDBMUFTUTBOE
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In each of these stages, theoretical understanding and discipline can play an 
important role and adds to the quality of the empirical work.
Identifying a Research Question 
Take the economic worldview as an example. The key to the economic worldview 
is trade-offs. Resources are scare so economic players trade off marginal benefit and 
marginal cost to reach (interior) solutions in most choice problems. As scientists 
studying choices made by economic players, researchers with an economic outlook 
must recognize that every choice they study (for example, corporate disclosure made by 
managers to the capital market or the pay-for-performance bonus rate chosen by the 
ﬁrm to compensate managers) is a result of a cost-beneﬁt trade-oﬀ. In theory terms, the 
choice made by an economic player is a solution to some ﬁrst-order-condition (FOC) 
equation. Further, any valuation (such as market prices) which depends on this type of 
choice must be recognized as functions of these solutions. This theoretical economic 
framing leads directly to the first stage of empirical work: identifying the research 
question.
Here the lesson is identifying an economic trade-oﬀ. When studying any economic/
accounting phenomena, the first issue has to be what is the economic trade-off 
underlying the object of one’s study. To be more precise, suppose the objects of the 
study are economic/accounting choices such as disclosure or bonus-rates. Let them be 
represented by the variable x. The ﬁrst point is that x must be a solution to a ﬁrst-order-
condition:
         (1)
The framing forces researchers to think about (1) who are the players choosing x, 
(2) what are the factors going into function V(.), and (3) are there constraints in the 
choice problem. For these choices to be interesting both theoretically and empirically, 
one would expect them not to be extreme choices generally (for example, full disclosure 
or non-disclosure; zero- or inﬁnity-bonus rates for all ﬁrms at all times). In theoretical 
terms, we say the choices are interior or the optimal x is not at the corners of the choices 
set X. In other words, whenever the research question is formulated, economic theory 
demands that we ﬁrst ask whether or not the empirical relation to be examined already 
has a theoretical answer. For example, suppose one is about to study the determinants 
of corporate disclosure. It must be the case that disclosure has a both economic beneﬁts 
and costs, and depending on the magnitude of these beneﬁts and costs, diﬀerent ﬁrms 
may arrive at diﬀerent but individually optimal disclosure choices.
max V (x, a, b) a FOC :        V = 0 a x* = f (a, b)
∂x
∂
x X
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Developing Research Hypotheses
Once the research question is formulated and an economic framework has been 
established, the next stage is to design speciﬁc empirical hypotheses to be examined. 
Here the formulated ﬁrst-order-condition is particularly useful. In our general example, 
the simplest empirical hypotheses can be based on comparative statics in equation (1). 
That is, we first compute the comparative statics on the solution of the first-order-
condition. For example, we compute: 
        (1a)
Theory predicts both the sign (positive or negative) and the magnitude (large or 
small) of partial-derivatives. These properties are the basis for empirical hypotheses. 
Sometimes theoretical properties may be ambiguous. For example, industry competition 
(say variable b) may affect both the marginal benefit and marginal cost of corporate 
disclosure (choice variable x), so how variable b aﬀects choice variable x may become 
an “empirical” question. When data are collected on the choice variable x (disclosure or 
bonus-rate) and independent variables a and b (for example, industry competition, risk-
proﬁle of the ﬁrm), the ﬁrst-order condition justiﬁes a cross-sectional regression relating 
optimal choice of x to variables a and b, along with other scaling variables necessary for 
the empirical speciﬁcation.
If the hypothesized economic tradeoﬀ were true and the collected sample contains 
enough variation in a andb (and with enough power), the empirical test would reject the 
null hypothesis that there is no relation between choice variable x and model parameter 
a (or the derivatives are zero). 
Designing and Conducting Empirical Tests
When designing and conducting empirical tests, theory can be helpful in more subtle 
ways. For example, theory may lead one to rethink empirical strategy if an additional 
layer is added. Suppose variable a is, in fact, a choice as well, either by the same ﬁrm or 
other ﬁrms or entities, that is:
        (2)
Combining equations (1) and (2) forms a structural speciﬁcation of the economic 
relations of interests. Recognizing the endogenous nature of variable a, a reduced-form 
speciﬁcation would become:
x*  =         f  (a, b) and         x*  =         f (a, b)
∂a
∂
∂a
∂
∂b
∂
∂b
∂
max U (a, b, c) a FOC :        U = 0 a a* = g (b, c)
a
∂
∂a
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        (3)
Within this simple setup2, we can point to the challenges of the empirical design. 
First, we can identify the “endogeneity” problem in this study. That is, variable a is 
a choice variable as shown in equation (2) but is mistakenly treated as independent 
variable in equation (1): a is endogenous. Second, inferences based on the statistical 
relation between x and a (in equation 1) are, in fact, driven by the variation in variables 
b and c, which according to equation (3) jointly drive choice variables x and a. Based 
on this reasoning, empirical specifications can differ based on which variables are 
treated as choice variables (that is, solutions to first-order-conditions) and which are 
not. In summary, theoretical design and speciﬁcations determine empirical design and 
speciﬁcations. 
One can also consider the case where many left-hand-side variables are not choices 
variables per se; value and price are good examples. That is, these variables are functions 
of choice variables (firm value is a function of disclosure or bonus-rates; a market 
clearing price is a function of many choices made by diﬀerent individuals and ﬁrms). Re-
injecting equation (3) into the value function of equations (1) and (2), we have
        (4)
Similar analysis, such as comparative statics, can be performed and empirical 
speciﬁcations can be derived based on equation (4). This iterative process is the key to a 
solid foundation for empirical investigation and to the resolution of existing empirical 
puzzles.
Interpreting Test Findings
Viewed as a compression of data with error, even very good theory will “fail” some 
empirical tests when we look hard enough and shed light on the “error” part of the 
theory. When an empirical test rejects a prediction of a theory,3 can we say such a failed 
x* = f ( g (b, c), b ) = h (b, c)
 a* = g (b, c)
V (x*, a*, b) = V ( h (b, c), g (b, c), b ) = m (b, c)
 U (a*, b, c) = U ( g (b, c), b, c )= n (b, c)
2 Equation (2) can be more complicated than what is shown. For example, objective U(.) may be a function of 
the choice x. In that case, timing of these choices becomes important. Further, choices x and a may all represent 
a series of choices over a long period of time. In that case, dynamics become the key issue. Either way, the 
resulting structural relations can be incredibly complicated, posing both theoretical and empirical challenges.
3 More appropriately, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis assuming the alternative hypothesis represents the 
theoretical prediction.
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theory is of no use? Here the discussion by Stanford economist David M. Kreps (1990) 
is particularly useful. According to Kreps, knowing what assumptions lead to falsiﬁed 
conclusions is beneﬁcial because “it is often a good place to begin to ﬁgure out what 
does” (p. 9). Without the failed first or second or third trials, there may not be the 
eventual successful theory at the 100th trial. Finally, “models that fail to predict because 
they lack certain realistic features can still help clarify the analyst’s thinking about the 
features they do encompass, as long as the analyst is able to combine intuitively and 
informally what has been omitted from the model with what has been learned from it” 
(p. 9-10).
Aside from dealing with falsiﬁed theory, our problem may extend to theories which 
are too complicated to be tested with any power or with any economic significance. 
Another issue can be that a theory can appear to be so simple that its predictions are too 
obvious to test. These also post challenges for empirical work and may frustrate empirical 
researchers. What happens when some theories have never been and perhaps will never 
be tested empirically or in a lab? Viewed as data-compression devices, even untested 
theories may be useful as long as it helps us organize our thoughts, ideas or intuitions 
and helps put in perspectives things that have been personally or casually observed.
The lesson here is that there is a judgment side of conducting social science research. 
There is no set formula to build a model or design an empirical specification. It all 
depends on what one seeks to better understand. As such, any ﬁnding from an empirical 
test is a prisoner of its own prejudice and limitations of the underlying (explicitly or 
implicitly stated) theory. As researchers, we restrict our attention to certain main eﬀects 
when analyzing the phenomena of our interest to achieve scientiﬁc precision. For the 
better, the ﬁndings help us understand the economic relation within our narrow scope of 
study. For the worse, the ﬁndings may lead us to miss the more importation relation or 
factors that we deliberately assume away.
At this stage, theory is helpful because of its own explicit acknowledgement of 
assumptions. As a data compression device, all theories suffer loss of information in 
the process. Even if a theory is successful in the sense that empirical data may support 
its predictions, it nevertheless misses some part of the social phenomena in reality. It is 
our job to always search for improved data-compression devices. As such, theoretical 
considerations at this stage make us more humble and perhaps fan the desire for better 
future research.
4.  A Separate Theory for China?
As researchers interested in institutions in China or other emerging markets, we are 
often tempted to ask whether “western” theoretical predictions can be generalized to 
China, and whether we need to develop our own (Chinese) theoretical foundations on 
which (Chinese) empirical studies must follow. As a general idea, I believe this kind of 
thinking is dangerous and represents an impediment to progress, especially in the area of 
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higher learning. But as a speciﬁc idea on how general theory should be specialized to the 
speciﬁc institutional features associated with emerging markets like China, I view such 
adaptations as necessary and a catalyst for progress. Further, when such institutional 
features change in response to the gradual maturity of emerging markets, the general 
theorymust be reapplied accordingly.
As a general principle, this kind of idea belongs to a type of philosophy called 
Exceptionalism. It has many variations. In the rapid rise of Great Britain during the 
1800s, British Exceptionalism was an integral part of its national myth, as well as a key 
explanation of how a geographically small country emerged as a great commercial and 
maritime power. In political philosophy, American Exceptionalism is the theory that 
the United States is an exception to the norm and deserved a special space among the 
nations of the world because of its unique immigrant-based population, its geopolitical 
location, its unique founding, its unique political and religious institutions, and its 
apparent departure from some assumed norms of national development.
The idea that China can be an exception from assumed general economic relations 
is very similar to the earlier Exceptionalism, either the British or American version, 
and is typically associated with the rise of a young nation/economy. But reviewingthe 
history, it seems the law of nature always prevails and these Exceptionalisms have proved 
to be quite outdated ideas. Good theories stand the test of time and space no matter 
how strange they may initially appear and bad theories won’t no matter how “oﬃcial” 
they can be. Viewed in such fashion, I believe we should doubt the validity of such 
Exceptionalism claims when stated in general terms. The “Lucas Critique,” which is 
an important innovation in economic theory in the past 50 years, does not have any 
national boundaries. Agency theory deals with economic problems emanating from 
information asymmetry among economic agents, which again, do not have any national 
boundaries.
However, viewed at the level of a speciﬁc issue, the “exception” idea may actually be 
quite useful. Every economy at some stage will have its unique institutional features, 
such as the existence of strong state- and family-controlled economic entities or the lack 
of market institutions like property rights protection. These institutional features are 
typically very hard and slow to change (but they do change); and these institutions do 
aﬀect economic relations. In our earlier example, suppose the local institution is such 
that variable a is not a choice variable at all. Then as a result, equation (1), instead of 
(3), is the correct empirical speciﬁcation to be tested. As such, economic theories and 
resultant empirical relations must take the existence and impact of these institutions 
into account. However, emerging economies, by deﬁnition, have a temporal property 
because the name suggests that in time these economies would emerge and become 
established economies where stable and progressive institutions would prevail and so will 
the prevailing economic relations suitable for such a mature and developed economy. 
By then, we will no longer need to worry about “Chinese” economics versus “Western” 
economics; they will simply be economics.
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5.  Theory Is Fun!
How can theory be fun? Many of us have a painful experience reading theory papers 
with all those mathematical expressions and Greek symbols that are so hard to even 
pronounce. Equating theory and math is another myth about theoretical work in social 
science. Yes, knowing mathematics helps to construct precise arguments about somewhat 
complicated economic arguments. Yes, being better at mathematics sometimes makes 
theory researchers better. But as most successful theorists would attest, the most 
important and fun part of theory may not be the math at all. The key to theory (thus the 
key to reading, learning, and using theory) is the recognition of a critical issue of interest 
(or idea) and the ability to think through the issue in a logical and coherent manner. It 
just happens that mathematics has become, as a convention, the most convenient and 
direct way to communicate such ideas. But math is never at the center stage. Good ideas 
are.
As scientists, we are both consumers and producers of research. As producers of 
research, we rationally choose to be specialists (“carnivore” or “herbivores” of a certain 
kind), exploiting comparative advantage and economies of scale. As consumers of 
research, we should choose to be generalists (“omnivores” in the literal sense: meaning 
eater of everything).
To accounting scholars, this invitation to theory is wide and open for both: as 
producers and as consumers, perhaps especially the later. Just as more and better 
consumption of empirical work makes a better producer of theoretical research, more 
and better consumption of theoretical work makes a better producer of empirical 
research. So accept the invitation and look around, you may ﬁnd lots of fun as well as 
clues for your own work, empirical or theoretical.
It is always exciting to study theory, especially now. Just as the world economic 
environment is experiencing a much-needed rebalancing, thus creating an opportunity 
to equalize the past disparity of wealth and development, the existing theoretical order 
in accounting is rebalancing given the stress on accounting institutions created by the 
changing economic environment of the world. While the economic use of information 
remains as the core of accounting phenomena,4 the rebalancing brings about new 
research dimensions. Here are a few examples of the emerging and exciting new 
opportunities for accounting research both in theory and in empirical work.
t ɨFSPMFPGBDDPVOUJOHJONBDSPPSBHHSFHBUFCFIBWJPSJTBOFNFSHJOHUPQJDCPUIJO
theory and empirical work, especially in light of the ﬁnancial crisis in the past two 
years. This is signiﬁcant for accounting because for a long time accounting research 
has been mostly focused on individual ﬁrm/entity level, as opposed to the macro- 
4 For an expanded argument for this point, see my article in a 2008 issue of China Accounting Review, co-
authored with Professor Xiao-Jun Zhang of UC-Berkeley (Liang and Zhang, 2008).
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or economy-wide level. With this direction, learning from macro- and monetary-
economics will become necessary for accounting researchers. 
t 4JNJMBSMZ FBSMZ UIFPSFUJDBM GPDVT PO TQFDJGJDNBOBHFSJBM DPOUSPM MBSHFMZ CBTFE PO
agency theory, has shifted to become a much broader examination of the governance 
structure of either corporate or public entities. Theory is much needed in formulating 
this general governance issue with a mixture of markets and contracting approaches 
in a dynamic setting.
t 'JOBMMZSFQVUBUJPOIBTCFDPNFBOJODSFBTJOHMZJNQPSUBOUGBDUPSPGQSPEVDUJPOJOUIF
study of many economic phenomena. Examples are auditors’ reputation for quality 
assurance services, ﬁrms’ reputation to disclose quality information, and regulators’ 
reputation to follow through on policy commitments. Advances in repeated game 
theory have made the systematic examination of reputation both feasible and more 
conducive to applications such as accounting. 
With so much to learn and so much promise, I believe it is quite fun to be a student 
of theory today.
In the end, having fun is what ultimately makes good research happen. When we 
learn production functions in economics, a two-factor function is typical: output is a 
function of capital (K) and labor (L). If one were to consider the production function of 
good research, what would it look like? Capital is needed, researchers need a building to 
work, a chair to sit on and a computer to run programs, etc. Labor is obviously needed 
as all scholars, especially young scholars, need time to develop their skills and time to 
apply their skills to frontier questions. But to produce good research, physical capital 
and repetitive labor are typically not enough, unlike the production of many other 
goods. Good research is typically a result of some group of creative individuals having a 
lot of fun working. In other words, good research requires PASSION. So go out there 
and have fun!
References
Arya, A., Fellingham, J. C., Glover, J. C., Schroeder, D. A., Strang, G., 2000. Inferring transactions from 
ﬁnancial statements. Contemporary Accounting Research17 (3): 365-385.
Ball, R., 1989. The ﬁrm as a specialist contracting intermediary: Application to accounting and auditing.
Working Paper, University of Rochester.
Beaver, W. H., 1981.Financial reporting: An accounting revolution. Englewood Cliﬀs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W.,Ijiri, Y, 1963. Breakeven budgeting and programming to goals. Journal of 
Accounting Research 1:16-43.
Christense, J., Demski, J., 2002. Accounting theory: An information content perspective. New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Christense, P., Feltham, G., 2002. Economics of accounting: Information in markets, Vol. 1. New York, NY: 
Springer.
Christense, P., Feltham, G., 2007. Economics of accounting: Performance evaluation, Vol. 2. New York, NY: 
Springer.
PIERRE JINGHONG LIANG12
Cyert, R., March, J. G., 1963.A behavioral theory of the ﬁrm.Maldon, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Cyert, R., Trueblood, R. M., 1957. Sampling technique in accounting. New York, NY: Prentice Hall.
Demski, J. S., Feltham, G. A., 1976. Cost determination: A conceptual approach. 1st ed. Ed. Ames, Iowa: 
Iowa State University Press.
Demski, J., Fellingham, J., Glover, J., Ijiri, Y., Liang, P. J., Sunder, S., 2002.Some thoughts on the 
intellectual foundations of accounting.Accounting Horizons 16 (2):157-168.
Gonedes, N., Dopuch, N., 1974. Capital market equilibrium, informationproduction and selecting 
accounting techniques: Theoretical framework and review of empirical work. Journal of Accounting 
Research 12 (Supp): 48-169.
Hilton, R., 1985. Probabilistic choice models and information. Sarasota, FL: American Accounting 
Association.
Ijiri, Y., 1967. The foundations of accounting measurement: A mathematical, economic, and behavioral 
inquiry. Houston, TX: Scholars Book Co.
Kaplan, R. M., Thompson, G. L., 1971. Overhead allocation via mathematical programming models. 
Accounting Review 46 (1):352-364.
Koopmans,T., 1947.Measurement without theory.Review of Economics and Statistics29 (3):161-172.
Kreps, D., 1990. A course in microeconomic theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Liang, P. J., 2001. Accounting recognition: An information content perspective. Accounting Horizons15 (3): 
223-242.
Liang, P. J., Zhang, X. J., 2008. Information economics and accounting measurement: Ablueprint for 
scholarly research. China Accounting Review6 (1):93-101.
Lucas, R.E., 1972.Expectations and the neutrality of money. Journal of Economic Theory 4: 103-124.
Lucas, R.E., 1976. Econometric policy evaluation: A critique. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on 
Public Policy 1: 19-46.
Mattessich, R., 1964. Accounting and analytical methods. Homewood, IL: Irwin.
McCallum, B., 1989. Monetary economics: Theory and policy. New York, NY: Prentice Hall.
Miller, M. H., Modigliani, F., 1958.The cost of capital, corporation ﬁnance, and the theory of investment. 
American Economic Review 48 (June):261-297.
Muth, J., 1961. Rational expectations and the theory of price movements.Econometrica 29:315-335.
Phelps, E., 1987. Phillips curves, in The new palgrave: Adictionary of economics. London:Macmillan.
Simon, H. A., 1947. Administrative behavior:A study of decision-making processes in administrative 
organization. New York: Macmillan Co.
Sims, C., 1996. Macroeconomics and methodology. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10: 105-120.
Sterling, R. R., 1970. Theory of the measurement of enterprise income. Lawrence, KS: The University of 
Kansas Press.
Sunder, S., 1997. Theory of accounting and control. Cincinnati, OH: Thomson Press.
Watts, R., Zimmerman, J., 1986. Positive accounting theory. Englewood Cliﬀs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
